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Infallible Knowledge: Contrastivism and the Structure of Propositions 
ABSTRACT 
Epistemological contrastivism can model how infallible knowledge functions by employing the 
explanatory resource of structural differences between contrastive propositions, e.g., “P rather than 
Q”, and orthodox propositions, e.g., “P”. In doing so we notice that how this difference factors 
into our conception of infallible knowledge depends on two aspects: one, whether belief acts as a 
necessary condition for knowledge, and two, whether epistemic justification is construed as 
consciously internalist or non-consciously externalist. We further leverage the notion of 
phenomenal resolution, conceived as an outcome of one’s discriminative capacities in accessing 
their evidence, to clarify in what sense it becomes reasonable to say that the truth of P mutually 
excludes the truth of Q when the latter is contrasted to the former. Importantly then, there is a way 
of infallibly knowing that P that is indistinguishable from infallibly knowing that P rather than Q, 
and a way that is not. 
Keywords: Contrastivism, Infallible Knowledge, Propositions, Doubt, Belief 
1. Introduction 
How would one know that P in a way that leaves no room for being mistaken? A reasonably 
initial approximation could be that P is known for sure once P becomes indubitable. Put as a 
question, what of P is such that one cannot doubt that P? A subsequent approximation is that P is 
known for sure once P infallibly refers to whatever is claimed as known. Does it then matter how 
P specifically refers, besides infallibly so, to whatever is claimed as such? This paper explores 
viable answers to these questions by way of elucidating a possible structure for P itself, in terms 
of its semantic content and justificatory character, through an appropriation of the explanatory 
resources from epistemological contrastivism. As an account of the very structure of 
epistemologically relevant relations, such as knowledge and belief, contrastive explanations for 
epistemic states can be general enough to accommodate varying accounts of epistemic 
justification. Although a contrastive notion of belief is not the main focus for this paper, what will 
hopefully become clear is that, due to contrastivist knowledge permitting varying justificatory 
accounts, how P becomes indubitable and infallibly referential centers both on how P is structured 
and whether a knowledge account requires a doxastic attitude for its justificatory features.  
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Sections 2-3 outline the contrastivist account of knowledge before, in Sections 4-7, 
fleshing out some importantly finer ramifications towards accounts of knowledge that either 
necessitate belief or not. Section 8 utilizes what has been discussed up until that point to inform 
different conceptions of the indubitably known proposition. Section 9 then compares these 
conceptions in their association to both contrastive and non-contrastive forms of knowledge, 
evaluating these associations’ “fit” as either ad hoc or not, before concluding in Section 10. 
2. General Remarks on Contrastivism 
 Jonathan Schaffer (2012c) introduces contrastivism succinctly by comparison with the 
non-contrastivist “orthodox” view: 
The orthodox view is that knowledge is a two-place relation, with one place fit for a subject and 
another place fit for a proposition. The contrastive view is that knowledge is a three-place relation, 
with an additional place fit for a contrast proposition, in addition to the place fit for a subject and 
the place fit for a proposition. In short: instead of the orthodox two-place Ksp structure (“s knows 
that p”), the contrastivist posits the three-place Kspq structure (“s knows that p rather than q”). 
(353)1 
The motivation behind defining knowledge as a “three-place relation” is that, for Schaffer (2012c), 
it helps explain, more so than orthodoxy, the reasonableness behind claims such as, ‘Ann might 
well know that there is a goldfinch in the garden rather than a raven, but yet fail to know that there 
is a goldfinch in the garden rather than a canary.’ (354) To see why, first note that it is not 
groundless to distinguish between “goldfinch rather than raven” and “goldfinch rather than canary” 
in knowledge attributions, as it could be the case that Ann’s ability to visually discriminate between 
goldfinches and ravens is not potent enough to discriminate between goldfinches and canaries, 
which look more similar to goldfinches than ravens do. As such, according to Schaffer (2012c), 
Ann’s ‘abilities and disabilities would then explain why she knows that there is a goldfinch in the 
garden rather than a raven, yet fails to know that there is a goldfinch in the garden rather than a 
canary.’ (354)2 
 
1 Epistemic contrastivism did not originate with Schaffer. It has had incipient expression in Dretske (1970). 
2 Cf., Schaffer (2012a, 365-6) for a more detailed discussion on the importance of discriminative abilities for 
contrastive knowledge. 
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 What is important for a contrastivist epistemology, then, is figuring out what best explains 
claims of the form, “S knows that P rather than Q”, and whether such explanations are not only 
realistic but also not inter-translatable to orthodoxy. Schaffer focuses on discriminatory capacity 
as an explanatory source, but we can generalise: an explanation of S’s knowledge that P rather 
than Q would have to be relevant to that contrast of P and Q without it translating as an explanation 
for S’s non-contrastivist knowledge that P, given that contrastivism and orthodoxy are two distinct 
epistemic models. In effect, having explanatory crossover between contrastivism and orthodoxy 
would entail that any epistemic claim accountable by the former would be accountable also by the 
latter, and vice versa, thereby leaving contrastivism without explanatory advantage over 
orthodoxy. If, however, there are epistemic claims that are relevant only to contrastive knowledge, 
then what helps account for them must be similarly relevant as well, otherwise the move from 
orthodoxy to contrastivism would be unmotivated.3  
To clarify, the important questions one must ask would be: 
1. Do explanations for contrastivist knowledge claims (S knows that P rather than Q) not 
translate as explanations for orthodox knowledge claims (S knows that P)? 
2. Are contrastivist knowledge claims unaccountable by the orthodox view? 
Answering both 1 and 2 would answer whether orthodoxy can explain non-contrastivist claims in 
the same way that contrastivism explains contrastivist claims (Question 1) and whether orthodoxy 
can explain contrastivist claims at all (Question 2). Question 1 effectively deals with whether 
orthodoxy can appropriate contrastivism’s own explanatory resources, such as discriminative 
capacity, for its own purposes, while Question 2 asks if orthodoxy can apply its own resources to 
contrastivism’s purposes. We first focus on discriminatory capacity as a way of answering 
Question 1, for insofar as discrimination can be construed as both a conscious and non-conscious 
function, it can be seen whether it applies to consciously reflective and non-consciously operative 
accounts of knowledge construed as either contrastivist or orthodox. We later focus on how 
discrimination may be used to account for some cases of mathematical and logical knowledge 
 
3 Steven Rieber (1998) agrees as much, in that, for him, what ‘counts as an explanation is highly context-dependent. 
In particular . . . it can depend on an implied contrast.’ (195) Rieber here is extending the general contrast-sensitivity 
of explanation to the realm of knowledge. 
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before answering Question 2 by asking whether contrastivist claims are logically translatable to 
orthodox ones – i.e., whether “P rather than Q” is just another way of semantically expressing “P”. 
Afterwards, we finally appropriate our answers to Questions 1 and 2 to briefly explore their 
ramifications towards the sense of ad hoc-ness implied in accounts of consciously/non-consciously 
relevant infallible contrastive or orthodox knowledge. 
3. Phenomenal Discrimination of Differing Contrast Classes 
 To begin, we must first understand what “P rather than Q” precisely means in terms of 
discriminative capacity, by figuring out what, for example, differentiates “knowledge that there is 
a goldfinch rather than raven” from “knowledge that there is a goldfinch rather than canary”.4 
Intuitively, the former – call it, KT:c-GR, expressing knowledge (KT) of a proposition that 
contrasts (c) proposition G with R – entails an epistemically salient phenomenal experience that 
allows one to distinguish goldfinches from ravens, while the latter – call it, KT:c-GC – does the 
same, except between goldfinches and canaries. We can instructively introduce the term, 
“phenomenal resolution”, to explain that the minimum resolution required for KT:c-GR is poorer 
than that for KT:c-GC; goldfinches and ravens register within one’s phenomenal experience as 
distinguishable for both KT:c-GR and KT:c-GC, while goldfinches and canaries register as 
distinguishable for KT:c-GC but indistinguishable for KT:c-GR.5 All this is saying is that there is 
more to phenomenally differentiate goldfinches from ravens then there is to differentiate 
goldfinches from canaries, and this relative difference is tracked by the distinction between KT:c-
GR and KT:c-GC. 
 Let us term “goldfinch rather than raven” as a different contrast class than “goldfinch rather 
than canary”. This means that, in general, we can characterise any contrast class of two 
propositions – let us say, P and L – necessitating a relatively low phenomenal resolution for 
 
4 We will, in Section 8, determine what “P rather than Q” generally means – as a logical entity, not merely one that is 
phenomenally ascertained for contrastive knowledge – in answering Question 2. 
5 There is no imposition here for a subject to know these birds in any level of detail other than what allows the subject 
to differentiate them phenomenally via their sensitive discriminatory capacities. Thus, no assumption is being made 
that someone possessing KT:c-GC is some expert ornithologist, just that they have a phenomenal capacity necessary 
for the visual, or otherwise phenomenal differentiation to take place, regardless of whatever background knowledge 
they may have. 
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knowledge, as allowing another contrast class – let us say, with P and H – necessitating a relatively 
high phenomenal resolution for knowledge. If we then classify “knowledge that P rather than L” 
as KT:c-PL, and “knowledge that P rather than H” as KT:c-PH, both implying knowledge that c-
PL (P rather than L) and that c-PH (P rather than H), respectively, we now have a general picture 
of contrastive knowledge accounting for epistemically relevant events featuring differing 
capacities of discriminative resolutions. Naturally, KT:c-PH entails at least the possibility of KT:c-
PL, since the former’s minimum resolution for knowledge includes the latter’s minimum 
resolution by being greater than it.  
If we further consider contrast sets of higher minimum resolutions as denoting more 
comprehensive resolutions – one has to discriminate more extensively for KT:c-PH than for KT:c-
PL (Cf., Tweedt, 2018, 222) – we will then be in a better position to understand Schaffer’s (2012a) 
conception of contrast class: knowing that P, as included within more comprehensive contrast 
classes,  
can be pictured in terms of finding actuality in widening regions of logical space, . . . [wherein the] 
(ideal) limit of [comprehension] would consist in finding [the actuality of P] from amongst all of 
logical space, which would be a full grasp of truth by evidence [within one’s ability to discriminate 
for]. (364, 365n19)6  
This is clear especially in the case of discriminative abilities, since the more extensive and precise 
those abilities are, the greater the resolution of what you are discriminating for becomes; moreover, 
although Schaffer is commenting on “widening regions of logical space”, this notion is still related 
to “more comprehensive extents of the minimum resolution required for knowledge” if we regard 
Schaffer’s version as the more general logical account that encompasses phenomenal 
accessibility.7 
 A consequence of this distinction between KT:c-PH and KT:c-PL is that there can be 
instances in which the latter obtains without the former obtaining. This commonly represents the 
 
6 For Schaffer (2012a), this widening actuality of P does ‘affect truth-values’ (369. Italics removed) of knowledge 
ascriptions of “S knows that P rather than Q” in different contexts that give Q different values entailing varying regions 
of the logical space for P. 
7 This relation between logical and phenomenal features of contrastivism is further explored in Sections 5 and 7. 
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contrastivist picture of the skeptical scenario, wherein KT:c-PH expresses knowledge of a 
skeptical c-PH, such as “I have hands rather than being a BIV”, that does not obtain, since we 
cannot tell for sure, as per how these scenarios typically function, whether we can phenomenally 
discriminate between BIV and not-BIV scenarios. The purpose of treating skeptical scenarios as 
such, at least in terms of an explanation for our knowledge that is based on phenomenal 
discrimination, is that the contrastivist is ensuring that what counts as knowledge of a skeptical c-
PH must rely on discriminative capacities that are beyond the human purview. In this way, one 
could reasonably deny some KT:c-PH dealing with the skeptical contrast class of hands and BIV 
while at the same time claiming some KT:c-PL of the form, “I know that I have experiences of 
hands rather than experiences of stumps”, as this form would rely on a minimum resolution well 
within one’s discriminative capacities: namely, one that at least distinguishes appearances of hands 
from appearances of stumps, i.e., deals with the non-skeptical contrast class of hands and stump 
appearances. 
 One benefit of this contrastivist reinterpretation of the skeptical scenario is that if the 
skeptic tries to deny anyone knowledge that, for example, one has hands, the contrastivist can 
retort by specifying that all one cannot know is that one has hands in the form of c-PH, but one 
can certainly know that they have hands in the form of c-PL. Pritchard (2008) agrees as much 
when he explains that, according to contrastivism, 
the sceptic illicitly changes the contrast class to one where one lacks knowledge of the target 
proposition [P]. That one lacks knowledge of [P] relative to the contrast class cited by the sceptic 
does not mean, however, that one lacks knowledge of [P] relative to ordinary non-sceptical contrast 
classes, and it is the latter knowledge that we are most interested in rescuing from the sceptic’s 
grasp. (307) 
It is therefore not irrational for S to doubt that she is not a BIV, because her evidence (E) – in this 
case, what is afforded by her discriminative capacities – would not meet the minimum resolution 
requirements for KT:c-PH regarding the skeptical hands-BIV contrast class. This E, however, 
would meet the minimum resolution requirements for KT:c-PL concerning the non-skeptical 
hands-stumps contrast class, given that E and c-PL necessarily deal with at least the same 
phenomenal resolution. 
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4. Contrastivism and Infallible Knowledge 
We will say that S could not know that c-PH, as she may be misled when E ≠R c-PH, but S 
could know that c-PL, as the referentiality of E =R c-PL could be epistemically accessed and 
believed by S.8 Therefore, a potential skeptical claim, “I doubt that I have hands”, can be 
counteracted by the non-skeptical claim that such doubt can only apply as the lack of knowledge 
that c-PH, but never as the necessary lack of knowledge that c-PL, which is always within one’s 
phenomenal resolution to discriminate for.9 This admits of infallibilism, yet it is not out of line 
with how Schaffer (2012a) explains justification in contrastive knowledge, in that, in terms of P 
and any true contrast Q such that KT:c-PQ obtains, ‘since [P] and [Q] are mutually exclusive, [P’s] 
truth implies [Q’s] falsity, . . . which is [attained through] conclusive evidence, evidence that could 
not possibly obtain without [P] being true.’ (378. Italics removed) Q must be at most at the same 
resolution as P, since here the resolution of Q would already be included in the resolution of P – 
e.g., the resolution of the goldfinch-raven contrast class is already surpassed by, yet included in 
the resolution of the goldfinch-canary contrast class – meaning that if P, in its at least higher 
resolution, obtains, then Q, in any similar or lower resolution, cannot obtain – e.g., if a goldfinch 
rather than a canary (c-GC) obtains, then necessarily a canary rather than a raven (c-CR) cannot 
obtain. Otherwise, if Q is at a higher resolution than P, then both P and Q could co-exist, since P 
only precludes Q’s truth at P’s resolution or lower. 
 
8 The use of “=R” in this paper, whenever E =R “some proposition”, is not meant to denote an equality of identity, but 
one of entailing referentiality so as not to conflate one’s evidence with the proposition referring to said evidence. This 
account is at this stage of the argument intentionally left general enough to encompass both internalist and externalist 
readings of propositional reference. See Notes 23 and 31 for a more detailed discussion. For the sake of brevity, the 
sense of entailment being employed here is of a semantically non-amplificatory relationship between evidence and 
proposition, in that what is meant by the proposition is solely the evidence it refers to. Whether the evidence is just 
what is phenomenally given when held in one’s mind or additionally its logical entailments is discussed in Sections 7 
and 8. 
9 The sense of doubt being employed here, and throughout the rest of this paper, resembles an infallibilist reading of 
Andrew Moon’s (2018) ‘Doubt2: S has some doubt that P if and only if S believes that not-P is possible, and it’s not 
the case that S believes that the possibility that not-P . . . [does not preclude] S’s knowing P.’ (1845-1846) A more 
detailed account is given below. 
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An interesting implication of this resolution overlap between P and Q is that if c-GC does 
not obtain, then c-CR could obtain even if what is actually there is a goldfinch. This occurs because 
all that c-CR tracks is that there is something phenomenally accessible for which S cannot 
distinguish between a goldfinch and a canary, but for which S can conclusively distinguish 
between a goldfinch-or-canary and a raven. S’s knowledge would then be applicable to c-CR 
without S having to worry about whether a goldfinch is actually there, since this fact here may lie 
outside S’s discriminatory capacity. S cannot discriminate at a resolution higher than that which 
differentiates goldfinches from ravens, so naturally, given that a goldfinch’s actuality may 
transcend its mere phenomenal appearance, S would not have to worry because the lack of said 
actuality’s conclusive accessibility entails that conclusive knowledge thereof does not obtain. 
Alternatively, since the goldfinch-canary contrast class cannot be distinguished by S, S’s 
knowledge would apply just as truthfully to c-GR (goldfinch rather than a raven) as it does to c-
CR (canary rather than a raven). Extending similarly to the skeptical scenario, wherein c-PL is at 
a lower resolution that is accessible by S than that of c-PH, the exact same results ensue: S’s 
knowledge that c-PL is ensured even if her knowledge that c-PH is not, and even if c-PH actually 
obtains as accessible in whatever way by someone other than S. 
To further substantiate the interpretation of knowledge as contrastivist, note that Schaffer’s 
“conclusive evidence” is simply the entailing phenomenal evidence (E) of E =R c-PQ that certifies 
Q’s falsity. Conclusively proving Q’s falsity ‘requires certainty, which is the absence of any doubt 
that [P] is true, . . . [but] the space of possibilities open to doubt is restricted to: {[P]} U {[Q]}.’ 
(Schaffer, 2012a, 378. Italics removed)10 If {P} U {Q} denotes the propositional elements 
contained within the sets of P or Q, then it would be consistent with its expression as what is 
logically denoted by the contrast “P rather than Q”, namely, P, Q (without Q exceeding P’s 
resolution), and their logical entailments. We can then further delineate between two types of 
doubt: irrational and rational. Irrational doubt would be persistent doubt even after mutual 
 
10 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) considers this doubt to be resolved once one ‘is able to rule out all other 
[possibilities] but is not able to rule out [P].’ (259) Additionally, Adam Morton and Antti Karjalainen (2008) interpret 
doubt resolution as consisting in ‘nearby worlds in which [Q] is true [being] distinguishable by the knower on the 
basis of evidence available to her from nearby worlds in which [P] is true.’ (276) Of course, the evidence from Q-true 
worlds must not exceed the resolution of evidence in P-true worlds for mutual exclusion between P and Q to occur. 
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exclusivity between P and Q is established, the latter occurring as establishment in one’s mind 
when the mutual exclusivity of P and Q, as c-PQ, is phenomenally given and believed through 
epistemic access of the referentiality of E =R c-PQ. In other words, irrational doubt occurs when 
all four listed conditions are true: 
(i**) there is entailment between S’s strength of epistemic position (SEP) and c-PQ, i.e., 
S’s evidence (E) =R c-PQ,
11  
(ii**) S can epistemically access (i**),12 
(iii**) S comes to believe that (i**) given awareness of (ii**),13 and, 
(iv**) S comes to believe in the non-entailment between S’s SEP and c-PQ. 
Rational doubt, on the other hand, occurs when (i**), (ii**), and (iv**) obtain without (iii**) 
obtaining: this referentiality of E =R c-PQ, while epistemically accessed but not believed, would 
not be established for S, as this establishment is achieved by her attending to the referentiality’s 
 
11 SEP is borrowed from Reed (2010) and Kim (2016) to indicate S’s general justificatory extent, which is broad 
enough to include both evidence and reasons. 
12 Specification between S’s conscious epistemic access of (i**) and non-conscious epistemic access of (i**) is being 
left out for now, since the important factor for (iii**) and (iv**), at least at this stage in the argument, is the doxastic 
component itself and not how it could come about, which can be either non-conscious causation or conscious 
motivation by one’s epistemic access of (i**). It should be noted that, although there is a general internalist/externalist 
divide being drawn here across the conscious/non-conscious divide, there are many different conceptions of the 
internalist/externalist divide, but we are setting aside direct engagement with these alternatives and instead prioritising 
the conscious/non-conscious divide for our purposes. In any case, internalist infallibilist knowledge concords 
somewhat with Ned Block’s characterisation of consciousness: infallible internalist knowledge deals with P-conscious 
states – i.e., phenomenal states. Knowledge can also deal with A-conscious states – i.e., states whose contents can be 
applied as premises in reasoning – but not necessarily, for it is not assumed here that internalist knowledge has to deal 
with conscious states that are, as Block puts it, ‘inferentially promiscuous’. (Block, 1995, 231) 
13 The sense of belief being employed here is internalist, that is, it is an attitudinal feature of some knower, S, granted 
that S’s attitudes are internal, i.e., conscious, at least when S is made aware of them. It is therefore open for S’s belief 
to be directed towards apprehended evidence attaining either internalist and/or externalist features. However, belief 
as internalist in nature is not the same as dispositional beliefs that are non-consciously possessed and thus externalist 
in nature. Cf., Lee (2018, §2.2) for a relevant discussion. Furthermore, (iii**) does not entail that mere belief is 
sufficient for a transition from K-ledge to KK-ledge; we are proposing here that when one epistemically accesses 
something, it becomes possible for one to subsequently believe what has been accessed in an awareful manner, which 
does instantiate KK-ledge. See Note 35 for further discussion on the matter. 
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phenomenal truth, as given by the entailment between E and c-PQ, and registering it doxastically 
in belief. 
 The obtaining of (i**) – (iii**) expresses a doxastic form of knowledge that we will term, 
KK-ledge, while the obtaining of (i**) – (ii**) expresses a non-doxastic form that we will term, 
K-ledge.14 This is not meant to mirror a distinction between knowledge as doxastic and knowledge 
as doxastic yet more reflective. What is being argued here between KK-ledge and K-ledge is a 
distinction that does not admit of degrees, but only of the fact that the former requires belief as a 
necessary condition, while the latter does not. As such this distinction is neutral concerning 
accounts of knowledge that do admit of degrees of epistemic reflectiveness.15 Lastly, to 
summarize, I see an infallible relation between an application of one’s discriminative capacities, 
which provides the evidence and proposition at hand in an entailing relation (=R) to each other, 
and knowledge (KK or K) of what the capacity is applied to by either not being aware of it (K) or 
being fully aware of it so as to believe it (KK).16 
 
14 In relation to the discussion in Note 12, KK-ledge involves being fully aware of the P-conscious state one is 
epistemically accessing, while K-ledge involves conscious access of a P-conscious state without being fully aware 
that one is doing so. Additionally, this formulation of contrastive KK-ledge concords with that of Jason Rourke (2013), 
in that S KKs that P rather than Q ‘iff (i) [P] is true, (ii) S has conclusive evidence that [P] rather than [Q], and (iii) S 
is certain that [P] rather than [Q] on the basis of (ii).’ (638) Due to differences in wording, a few points of clarification 
will help: one, the belief condition of (iii**) and that of certainty in (iii) are the same; two, (i) and (ii) both constitute 
(i**); three, the condition of epistemic access in (ii**) is added for the determination of contrastive knowledge so as 
to differentiate one merely being in an epistemic position to know from one actually knowing, in terms of either KK-
ledge or K-ledge. 
15 A famous account in this regard would be that of Ernest Sosa (2009). See Reed (2012) for a discussion on Sosa’s 
epistemology of KK-ledge. Nilanjan Das and Bernhard Salow (2018) also interpret KK-ledge as a more reflective 
knowledge – i.e., KK-ing that P is knowing that you know that P. The account of KK-ledge in this paper is quite 
different: just because S Ks that P does not necessarily put S in a position to KK that P, which is contrary to Das and 
Salow’s account (2018, 18n1). Stated in another way, here KK-ledge does not necessarily equate to K-ledge of K-
ledge. Section 6 offers further clarification on the matter. 
16 Additionally, this infallible relation can be construed as in concordance with a similar account in Ranalli (2014), 
insofar as any transformation from S’s discrimination of P which is in possession of some feature, F, to S’s KK-ledge 
or K-ledge that P is F requires F to be represented in S’s evidence that P is F. 
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To continue, in terms of conclusively discriminating P from Q, the phenomenal resolution 
over which S is required to discriminate to KK that c-PQ is simply what disallows one to rationally 
doubt that c-PQ. Thus, epistemically accessing and believing the true instantiation of P’s mutual 
exclusion of Q entails the impossibility of not-c-PQ, of not “P rather than Q”. Equivalently, this is 
the impossibility of c-QP, of “Q rather than P”. For Schaffer (2012a),  
possibility [Q] is eliminated for [S] (at t) iff [Q] is inconsistent with [S’s] total experience e (at t). 
[S] has conclusive evidence that [c-PQ], on this interpretation, iff [Q] is eliminated for S. (Notice 
that the actuality possibility [of any proposition given by e at t] cannot be eliminated; thus [P], if 
true, is ineliminable.) (378n46) 
Schaffer can be interpreted here as espousing an infallibilist reading of justification, in line with 
our infallibilist treating of knowledge here.17 Again, as stated before, Q must be at most at the 
same resolution as P. Moreover, S’s total experience (e) is simply S’s phenomenal evidence (E) at 
the time of KK-ledge formation, since we are dealing with phenomenal resolutions at this stage. 
In conclusion, there is an ease of interpretation of infallible KK-ledge as contrastivist, given that 
the evidentiary resource for contrastive KK-ledge that c-PQ, what Schaffer terms as “conclusive 
evidence” and/or “total experience”, can be modelled as E =R c-PQ for infallible KK-ledge. 
5. Contrastivist KK-ledge: Some Issues Regarding Propositional Fundamentality 
This concludes our initial outline of contrastivist KK-ledge. However, before moving on 
to a model of contrastivist K-ledge, we must address a fly in the ointment. Schaffer describes the 
impossibility of rationally doubting that c-PQ as the fact that Q can be rationally doubted – i.e., 
eliminated – while P cannot. The issue here is that Schaffer does not use c-QP in place of Q, and 
often just uses P without explicating it as c-PQ. Furthermore, for Q to be eliminated, it must lie at 
 
17 Schaffer does not just consider the validity of modelling contrastive knowledge as infallible; fallible knowledge is 
well within the scope of a contrastivist rearticulation. For example, I could fallibly KK that it will rain tomorrow rather 
than snow, while not fallibly KK-ing that it will rain heavily tomorrow rather than lightly drizzle, based on empirical 
meteorological models as my E; however, the rain-snow and rain-drizzle contrast propositions do not enter into a (=R) 
relation with my E, for the latter cannot infallibly guarantee either of the propositions’ truth. Cf., Baumann (2012a, 
§2; 2012b, §3) and Schaffer (2012b, §2.1) for a related discussion. However, a detailed analysis of fallible contrastive 
knowledge is not the main focus for this paper. 
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most at the same resolution as P, meaning that the eliminated Q is not of an indeterminate 
resolution, but that of the Q precisely involved in c-QP. This would additionally entail the Q of c-
QP possessing different resolution requirements than the P of c-PQ: the former Q can be of a lower 
resolution than the latter P, not vice versa, but only insofar as c-PQ is being established as infallibly 
known (KK). 
Of course, if, instead, c-QP is being established as infallibly known (KK), then P, as c-PQ, 
can be of at most the same resolution as that of Q, as c-QP, but not vice versa, if P is to be validly 
contrasted against Q. All this is saying is that infallibly KK-ing any proposition at a particular 
resolution requires contrasting that proposition against another one that does not exceed the first 
proposition’s resolution. For example, let us assume these statements to be true, “I KK I have 
hands rather than being a BIV” and “I KK I have hands rather than appearances of hands,” even 
though “BIV” and “appearances of hands” lie at different resolutions, because both do not exceed 
the resolution of “hands” used in both statements: the first is at the same resolution while the 
second is at a lower resolution. I cannot, however, then infallibly KK that “I have appearances of 
hands rather than actual hands” and have it be true, regardless of whether one can access the 
resolution of “actual hands” or not, since having handed appearances does not necessarily preclude 
there being actual hands. This follows from the rule that accessing something from a low resolution 
does not necessarily preclude something else being at a higher resolution. I also cannot say that I 
KK that “I have appearances of hands rather than appearances of stumps”, because once one KKs 
that c-PQ, any lower resolution c-QP then cannot obtain or be known (KK). The same reasoning 
applies even if the “hand appearances” contrast is changed into the “only hand appearances” 
contrast: already infallibly KK-ing that one has actual hands rather than only mere hand 
appearances precludes there being only handed appearances, or more precisely, KK-ledge that 
there are only hand appearances rather than either actual hands or stump appearances. 
In any case, if Schaffer’s use of Q is deliberately not that of c-QP, then what is the 
difference between Q and c-QP, and similarly, between P and c-PQ, if any? Schaffer gives us a 
hint in his fleshed-out answer to the skeptic, which is a reinterpretation of the fact that KK-ledge 
that c-PL, the contrast class of an accessibly low resolution, is ensured even if KK-ledge that c-
PH, the contrast class of an inaccessibly high resolution, is not, and even if c-PH actually obtains. 
Schaffer (2012a) notes that ‘[s]ince the existence of possibilities [at resolutions] outside one’s 
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discriminatory range does not imply the absence of any possibilities [at resolutions] inside that 
range, skeptical doubts do not imply the absence of ordinary knowledge.’ (386) This hints at the P 
of c-PH not being the same as the P of c-PL, as they reside at different resolutions. Indeed, having 
P be identical across varying contrast classes would be illicit for infallible KK-ledge: I cannot 
reasonably say with certainty that I KK that I have hands rather than stumps, for “stumps” here 
ambiguates between stump-experiences and stump-actuality, which lie at different resolutions – 
specifying the former leads to a true claim, while the latter leads to a false one.18 This ambiguous 
KK-ledge claim does not involve entailing evidence, for the claim ‘is compatible with multiple 
queried [contrasts]’ directed at realities of differing resolutions. (Schaffer, 2012a, 379) 
The fact that P differs between contrast classes is more clearly shown in summarizing 
Schaffer’s discussion of skepticism. Given P1 and L are contrasted at an epistemically accessible 
phenomenal resolution, and P2 and H are contrasted at an inaccessible one, then, 
1) I can KK P1 rather than L (I can have non-skeptical KK-ledge); 
2) If P2 then not-H (P2 and H are mutually exclusive); 
3) If I do not KK not-H rather than H, then I do not KK P2 rather than H; 
4) I do not KK not-H rather than H (I do not have skeptical KK-ledge). 
Therefore, I can only say of my lack of KK-ledge that I do not KK P2 rather than H, not that I 
cannot know P1 rather than L, the latter lack of KK-ledge being what the skeptic asserts, because 
while I do not possess skeptical KK-ledge, I can attain non-skeptical KK-ledge.19 Consequently, I 
cannot equate P1 and P2 together, or substitute some general P for both, for then I would be forced 
to conclude, given that, if P1 then not-L, “I do not KK not-L rather than H.” This statement is false, 
as H exceeds L’s resolution, meaning both are not contrastable together.20 
 
18 Cf., Schaffer (2012a, 381) for a more detailed explanation of this notion of ambiguation. 
19 This is a scenario wherein the skeptic illicitly shuttles a skeptically high SEP standard to the non-skeptical context 
when closure is not denied for cases of closure violation, thus disallowing us the possibility of KK-ledge that, for 
example, c-P1L. Cf., Reed (2010, 233ff., 241n35). Moreover, Cf., Schaffer (2012a, 385-7) for his fuller exposition on 
skepticism. 
20 Morton and Karjalainen (2008) concur, in that, for them, ‘deduction can extend contrastive knowledge only when 
it works within the set of propositions implicit in the [same resolution].’ (275)  
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All this means is that c-PH and c-PL ought to be more accurately represented as c-P2H (P2 
rather than H) and c-P1L (P1 rather that L), respectively.21 However, if we follow this 
representation, then P2 would be at the same resolution implied by c-P2H, and similarly between 
P1 and c-P1L. More specifically, since P1 is at the resolution of c-P1L, the instantiation of P1 
would already attain the same function as c-P1L’s instantiation: the prohibition of L. This is the 
case wherein, say, being aware of one’s handed appearance prohibits the instantiation of stump 
appearances without the former having to be formulated as, “handed appearance rather than stump 
appearance.” 
Differentiating between contrast classes in terms of varying resolutions helps answer Peter 
Baumann’s critique against contrastivism. Baumann (2012a) interprets the contrastivist position 
to entail that, if S ‘knows that [P] rather than [Q], then there is no defeating proposition [R] for 
[P]’, which he calls ‘Distinguish-a’. (402) He then applies this entailment to the skeptical scenario, 
when we are incapable of knowing a skeptical hypothesis, in order to undermine contrastivism: 
There is, however, a huge fly in the ointment: What if [R] is a sceptical hypothesis? By the very 
nature of a sceptical hypothesis, we can in principle not distinguish between an ordinary scenario 
[P] and a sceptical one [R]. The contrastivist wants to say that we don’t know that [P] rather than 
[R]. Given [Distinguish-a], we would then have to accept that we don’t know that [P] rather than 
[Q] – for any ordinary propositions [P] and [Q]. This is unacceptable to the contrastivist. (Baumann, 
2012a, 403)  
Baumann seems to be missing the point entirely, as the only way in which r could defeat knowledge 
that P rather than Q is if R was at the same resolution of “P rather than Q”; given that the skeptical 
hypothesis is not dealing with the same resolution of the “ordinary propositions P and Q”, then the 
skeptical hypothesis does not act as a defeating proposition. Ultimately, Baumann (2012a) tries to 
resolve what he sees to be an issue with contrastivism, as brought up by Distinguish-a, by 
 
21 Schaffer (2012a) at least acknowledges that different contrasts ‘determine differences in the proposition expressed’, 
(374) although he may be applying this solely to the contrast proposition, Q, as opposed to the target proposition, P. 
Cf., Schaffer and Knobe (2012, 687). Sinnott-Armstrong (2008), however, argues against this, in that ‘[i]t is the reason 
that is contrastive, not the proposition’, but insofar as our ‘reason favours one thing and disfavours others’, (258) then 
we have to be precise in what this favored “thing” is, which can be given in different resolutions through different 
contrasts. 
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explaining that when ‘we say that S knows that [P] rather than [Q], we are excluding any 
proposition like [R]. . . . However, we are not thereby denying that there are such propositions 
(like [R]).’ (405) Nevertheless, what Baumann misunderstands is that how R gets excluded is by 
the logical nature of “S knows that P rather than Q” at a different resolution to that of R, not by, 
as Baumann asserts, separately specifying what is allowed as R. (Cf., Baumann, 2012a, §3) 
This delineation of P and Q into the different resolutions of (P1 and P2) and (L and H), 
respectively, also avoids the problems normally associated to contrastive closure. For example, 
consider Christoph Kelp’s (2011, 290) objection that S being deceived into merely believing “P” 
when Q actually obtains instead can transform S’s KK-ledge that “P” rather than “Q” into S’s KK-
ledge that “P” rather than “S being deceived into merely believing P, when Q actually obtains 
instead,” which is epistemically immodest. Kelp’s objection fails here because both P and Q in “P” 
rather than “Q” are of different resolutions than those in “P” rather than “S being deceived into 
merely believing P, when Q actually obtains instead.” Additionally, the criticism of Michael 
Hughes (2013) also does not pan out. He claims that, given certain conditions. we can attain the 
epistemically immodest scenario wherein S ‘can come to know that (([S has] hands and [is] not a 
BIV) rather than that [S is] an amputee)’ from the epistemically modest scenario wherein S knows 
that she has hands rather than being an amputee (588). The required condition is derived from 
Schaffer’s (2007, 243) account that, if S KKs that A1 rather than Q, and A1 → A2, then S can 
deduce from this her KK-ledge that A2 rather than Q. Hughes’ criticism is faulty in the case of P’s 
differentiation into P1 and P2 because, unlike the case of A1 → A2, it is not the case that P1 → 
P2, meaning that “S has hands and is not a BIV”, as P2, does not follow from “S has hands”, as 
P1, which Hughes simply denies. All in all, contrastivism can begin to sidestep issues with 
epistemic closure as long as closure at least obtains between propositions of the same resolution, 
which may be what is being expressed in Kvanvig (2008, 253), Gerken (2013, §3), and Tweedt 
(2018, 225n16). 
However, if we can then describe contrastive KK-ledge that c-P1L (three-part relation 
between KK-ledge, P1, and L) and orthodox KK-ledge that P1 (two-part relation between KK-
ledge and P1) in terms of them both precluding rational doubt that P1 through the prohibition of L 
at certain resolutions, then is discrimination at phenomenal resolutions not truly applicable to both 
contrastive and orthodox KK-ledge? From the above analysis, it does seem applicable, meaning 
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that we have thus answered Question 1 of Section 2; does this, though, apply to all cases of 
orthodox KK-ledge? If yes, then this may imply identity between orthodox and contrastive 
propositions, such as P1 and c-P1L, respectively; if no, then identity would not obtain. However, 
due to this analysis being about contrastive KK-ledge, it would behoove us first to see if 
phenomenal discrimination can apply to infallible K-ledge as well.22 
6. Contrastivism and Infallible K-ledge 
To begin, let us first outline that infallible knowledge that P, an orthodox account, 
manifests in two modes: 
a*) KK-ing that P: obtaining of (i*), an entailing SEP-P relation, or equivalently, E =R P; 
(ii*), the epistemic access of (i*); and (iii*), the belief of (i*) given awareness of (ii*). 
b*) K-ing that P: (iii*) not obtaining, with (i*) and (ii*) obtaining. 
For the contrastivist, to recap from Section 4, infallible knowledge that some c-PQ is attained 
similarly: 
a**) KK-ing that c-PQ: obtaining of (i**), an entailing SEP-(c-PQ) relation, or equivalently, 
E =R c-PQ; (ii**), the epistemic access of (i**); and (iii**), the belief of (i**) given 
awareness of (ii**). 
b**) K-ing that c-PQ: (iii**) not obtaining, with (i**) and (ii**) obtaining. 
In short, a**) and b**) together entail that epistemic access of E =R c-PQ is not enough for the 
establishment of the mutual exclusivity between P and Q for S, because S could have epistemic 
access without any attendant doxastic attitude towards E =R c-PQ. Furthermore, pertinent to this 
stage in the argument, we can differentiate (ii**) into: 
(Cii**) S can consciously epistemically access (i**), and, 
(NCii**) S can non-consciously epistemically access (i**). 
Therefore, we have:  
 
22 The following discussion, unless explicated otherwise, will consider K-ledge as having actually occurred, not merely 
being possible. 
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f**) Internalist K-ing that c-PQ: (iii**) not obtaining, with (i**) and (Cii**) obtaining;  
g**) Externalist K-ing that c-PQ: (iii**) not obtaining, with (i**) and (NCii**) obtaining.23 
It is in this sense that we can see how KK-ledge cannot be externalist, since belief is a conscious 
doxastic state.24 Lastly, both f**) and g**) are to be construed along causal lines, wherein 
epistemic access of E =R c-PQ, of whichever variety, simply causes one’s K-ledge that c-PQ 
without any doxastic necessitation.25 
 
23 This means that, taking a broader scope of the relation, E =R P, inasmuch as E =R P is consciously accessed (Cii*), 
E can only matter as internalist evidence. This should not imply that internalist knowledge (KK or K) necessarily 
disallows the existence of externalist E =R P, just that any E =R P that is consciously accessed and/or doxastically 
reacted to as belief is relevant only as internalist E =R P; thus, what is allowed as relevant is either wholly internalist 
E =R P or the internalist aspect(s) of a mixed internalist/externalist E =R P, and what is necessarily disallowed as 
relevant, but which may still exist, is wholly externalist E =R P. Conversely, any non-consciously accessed E =R P is 
relevant only in its externalist capacity, either as a wholly externalist or mixed internalist/externalist phenomenon. 
This would apply even for belief caused by such non-conscious access, which is an allowed scenario, for one could 
believe in something without ever being conscious of how that belief was caused, even if the cause was fully non-
conscious/externalist in origin. 
24 The incompatibility between KK-ledge, as formulated above, and externalism is reflected somewhat in the stance 
of Das (2019), although incompatibility may be mitigated through construing KK-ledge under the auspices of a fallible 
reliabilism (Das and Salow, 2018). On the other hand, one may instead have a conception of belief as non-conscious, 
excluding the notion of unformed dispositional beliefs that are non-conscious (see Note 13), in that S is in a belief 
state regarding P without being conscious about being in such a state. However, infallible KK-ledge was introduced 
to model one’s epistemic awareness in a way that infallible K-ledge cannot. If belief, at least in this essay, is to be 
proper to infallible KK-ledge, then labelling belief as non-conscious would be to focus solely on infallible K-ledge, 
which is not our purpose here. 
25 Regarding KK-ledge, Schaffer (2012c) believes that ‘context supplies a value for some sort of covert semantic 
material, perhaps via the question under discussion’. (355) Cf., Schaffer (2012a, 363). The semantic material here can 
be the values of P and Q in c-PQ that are implied by the conscious inquiry being undertaken, but if the context can be 
something other than a conscious assertion, then the context may be able to causally supply a value for P and Q 
concerning K-ledge that c-PQ. Nonetheless, the account of contrastivism being espoused here may be at odds with 
Schaffer’s stance inasmuch as he takes context to explicitly supply the aforementioned value; against this interpretation 
of Schaffer, I am arguing for a contrastivism wherein context only implicitly supplies a value that is explicitly given 
by inherent features of c-PQ itself. See Note 38 for additional discussion. 
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 Now, concerning whether infallible K-ledge makes use of phenomenal resolution 
regardless if it is characterized contrastively or orthodoxly, we must analyze this issue also along 
causal lines. Is discriminative capacity thus still relevant for the causation of K-ledge? Yes, but 
only insofar as one can be allowed to phenomenally discriminate without one being either 
conscious about it, or conscious but not doxastically reactive to it, for g**) or f**), respectively. 
If this can be reasonably allowed, then discriminative capacity, and by consequence, phenomenal 
resolution, become relevant for mere K-ledge. However, if, given our prior analysis of phenomenal 
resolution for infallible KK-ledge, c-P1L and P1 both reject L for the possible manifestation of 
KK-ledge, then this analysis should also now apply to K-ledge in terms of causation. In other 
words, both c-P1L and P1, by virtue of being at the same resolution, should also each cause an 
instance of K-ledge that P1 contrasted against L, since both propositions mutually exclude the 
truth of L. Indeed, if the only difference between K-ledge and KK-ledge is belief, and if mere 
belief does not add to nor subtract from the evidentiary content of the epistemically accessed 
phenomenal resolution,26 then what is significant for KK-ledge, barring belief, ought to be 
significant for K-ledge as well. To see this conclusion more clearly, we proceed with examples of 
knowledge of logic and mathematics. 
7. The Relevance of Phenomenal Resolution for Infallible KK/K-ledge27 
 For logic, we can ask how the resolution of a deductive chain is relevant for both S’s 
infallible KK-ledge and K-ledge that said chain is true. Let us allow, for both conscious and non-
conscious epistemic access, that S has the deductive chain in mind – i.e., she has the entailing 
evidence for the chain’s truth in mind. Let us also allow that she is entirely capable of not paying 
the required attention for infallible KK-ledge that the deductive chain is true28 – i.e., paying 
 
26 It is taken here that mere belief that P, based on evidence/reasons that P, does not elicit any relevant changes to the 
evidence or proposition that count towards KK-ledge that P. Specifically, the argument is made here in terms of 
evidence dealing with a phenomenal resolution that is represented by a particular proposition, either of contrastive or 
orthodox form. 
27 Any time the term “KK/K” is used, it indicates that the consideration being made at the time applies to both KK-
ledge and K-ledge. 
28 Cf., Schaffer (2012a, 385n) for a related mention in terms of the difference between competent deduction and being 
certain that one has competently deduced. 
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attention to each step in the chain, and how these contribute to its veracity, as the belief in the 
chain’s veracity is formed. We can thus construct varying contrast classes regarding the deductive 
chain at different phenomenal resolutions: the mind-dependent resolution, where reference is made 
only to the chain as within S’s purview of phenomenal, or more generally cognitive, 
discrimination, and the mind-independent resolution, where the chain is made to obtain regardless 
of how S accesses it. In terms of KK-ledge of the mind-dependent resolution, S can infallibly KK 
that the chain is true rather than false by the evidence (E) to which one has conscious epistemic 
access, but only if E is the chain in S’s mind with attention paid to the contribution of each step to 
the chain’s truth. For the mind-independent resolution however, S cannot infallibly KK that the 
chain is true rather than absolutely/mind-independently false – i.e., true regardless whether the 
evidence for its veracity is consciously attended to – for this mind-independent contrast class is 
defined as outside one’s discriminatory evidentiary capacities, in that the chain can possibly persist 
outside one’s accessed evidence for it. 
Note that such KK-ledge of the mind-dependent contrast class cannot be rationally 
doubted, while that of the mind-independent one can. This is because, for the mind-dependent 
class, insofar as S’s E, which includes the chain itself, is all that is referenced by P – that the chain 
is true rather than false in terms of itself being held in S’s mind – then all S would be paying 
attention to is the truth of E, which is already given by E itself as long as the chain is a proper 
deduction and that S acknowledges how it is properly deduced; moreover, how the chain is 
properly deduced can be reasonably considered as inherently part of E as well. As such, doubting 
the truth of E while it is fully attended to within one’s mind would be to doubt that E is itself, since 
E’s truth of self-identity is determined by E simply obtaining. This form of doubting entails that S 
would have the attitude of believing E’s non-entailing relation to its own truth – call this attitude 
A – and as long as this attitude’s perceived absurdity ends up leading S to believe E’s entailing 
relation to its own truth – call this attitude B – then any further doubt would be irrational due to 
the manifestation of the two contradictory attitudes of A and B. If, however, we are talking about 
the mind-independent class, then at least part of the chain, the part belonging strictly to said class, 
would be out of one’s mind, meaning since it is not certain for S that its entirety can be brought to 
one’s awareness, the chain, as mind-independently true, can be rationally doubtable. 
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In terms of K-ledge, the mind-dependent contrast class would still count towards S’s K-
ledge of said class, but it would attain for S in such a way that S’s KK-ledge and K-ledge of the 
class would occur through conscious epistemic access of the evidence (E) thereof; E here equates 
to the mind-dependent contrast class, and which, once epistemically accessed as evidence in one’s 
mind, both causes S’s K-ledge and, if believed by paying attention to the self-referentiality of E’s 
truth, forms S’s KK-ledge as well.29 This denotes that the facet of the mind-dependent class that 
factors into S’s K-ledge thereof can be rationally doubted. The mind-independent contrast class, 
on the other hand, while still rationally doubtable, could cause S’s K-ledge of it without S’s KK-
ledge obtaining. This could work as long as we can create a story wherein the E of the chain, which 
now is the chain in its mind-independent resolution and not a mind-dependent one, is something 
of which S’s epistemic accessing capacity is receptive;30 however, inasmuch as this receptivity is 
directed towards a mind-independent logical entity – i.e., one whose truth is mind-independent – 
then S’s K-ledge of it would be externalist, since mind-independence can be accounted for by non-
conscious access, but not conscious access, in terms of mind-independent access.31 If this is the 
case, then S’s non-conscious infallible K-ledge cannot guarantee S’s infallible KK-ledge, the latter 
relying for its certainty on at least conscious awareness of the epistemically accessed evidence. In 
 
29 A specific consequence of this would be the situation wherein S consciously accesses E =R “A → B → C”. Given 
that S knows that (A → C) iff S knows that [(A → B) ʌ (B → C)], then there is a case such that S can K that (A → C) 
while not KK that (A → C) if S consciously accesses E while not forming a belief that (A → B → C) based on E.  
30 Another way of stating this same reasoning appropriates Joshua Schechter’s (2013) claim that ‘[w]hether a thinker 
has made a competent deduction shouldn’t depend on her meta-beliefs about her reasoning.’ (437n23) Reed (2010) 
makes a similar comment in application to epistemic reliabilism, in that ‘[a] subject does not need to be aware that her 
faculties are reliable in order to [have knowledge]; all that matters is that her faculties are reliable.’ (236) 
31 I believe it erroneous to think of mind-independent access as one’s epistemic capacities directly accessing reality 
external to one’s mind, for this would make that external reality internal once it is directly in one’s mind. Nevertheless, 
it may be more appropriate to picture mind-independent access as indirect instead, wherein the E of external reality 
and the E of what’s captured in one’s mind are not identical to each other but have their identity determined in a 
parallel fashion, which allows for one’s epistemic accessing capacity to be receptive of mind-independent external 
truths in a non-conscious fashion without those truths being mistaken as consciously accessed mind-dependent truths. 
In relation to Note 23, we may consider the mind-independent contrast class as constitutive of either wholly externalist 
evidence or the externalist elements of mixed internalist/externalist evidence. For the mind-dependent contrast class, 
it would be constitutive of either wholly internalist evidence or the internalist elements of mixed internalist/externalist 
evidence. 
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any case, the differences in a deductive chain’s resolution impact not just KK-ledge, but K-ledge 
as well. 
 We now move on to mathematical KK/K-ledge. If we consider the equation, 1+1=2, as 
similar to a deductive chain, in that both can be held in S’s mind, then the same conclusion would 
seem to apply: S can infallibly KK that 1+1=2 is true rather than false given the equation as 
evidence (E) held in one’s mind, wherein the equation’s truth is granted by E itself. Moreover, 
depending on the E that one holds in one’s mind in infallibly KK-ing that 1+1=2 (particular 
impressions of things, the deduction from the law of identity, etc.) the resolution of that equality 
also changes. In effect, such KK-ledge of the equation gets qualified depending on the attendant 
contrast, since “I KK 1+1=2 rather than 1 apple plus 1 apple makes 3 apples” (the resolution is at 
the level of empirical phenomenon) is different from “I KK 1+1=2 rather than 1+1=3” (the 
resolution is at the abstract level of the law of identity).32 Lastly, in terms of infallible K-ledge, S 
could also infallibly K that 1+1=2 is true rather than absolutely false given a causal story from the 
equation’s (possibly mind-independent) fact to it being epistemically accessed in a non-conscious 
way. This is because the fact that an equation derives from mind-independently true basic axioms 
can act as part of an epistemic causal structure for one’s non-conscious K-ledge in the same way 
that mind-independently true deductive chains can.33 
Since we have shown that phenomenal resolution is significant for both KK-ledge and K-
ledge, and that resolution can be described in either orthodox or contrastive terms for KK-ledge, 
then we have shown that even resolution-based K-ledge can be described as either orthodox or 
contrastive. Does this entail, though, that P and c-PQ are absolutely indistinguishable, 
notwithstanding their logical function of mutually excluding Q for K-ledge and their doxastic 
function of precluding rational doubt of P for KK-ledge? Given that P for both types of 
 
32 This arguably answers Baumann’s (2012a, 397) critique of the viability of contrastive mathematical knowledge. 
33 This argument for mathematical K-ledge acts as a critique against Rieber’s (1998, 200) lack of conviction that 
mathematical knowledge functions causally. Indeed, if we presuppose that logical laws are factored a priori in every 
process of thought, (Cf., Boghossian, 2000) and that at least some facets of mathematical truth are intimately connected 
with logical laws (this connection is stated for the sake of the argument and arguing for or against it is beyond the 
scope for this essay), then we can say that at least part of the structure of thought itself acts as a causal influencer 
towards infallible mathematical K-ledge. 
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propositions is at the same resolution, then the function of “rather than Q” should hold the key for 
distinguishing P from c-PQ. In other words, there must be a way of infallibly KK/K-ing that P 
without KK/K-ing that it is contrasted against Q if we are to distinguish epistemic orthodoxy from 
contrastivism, which is the subject matter for our Question 2 in Section 2.34 
8. Distinguishing “P” and “c-PQ”: Clarifying the Structure of Infallibly Known (KK/K) 
Propositions 
The best way to illustrate this is by visualizing S as having conscious epistemic access to 
some experience, as experiential evidence (E), and nothing else, meaning that there is no other 
phenomenal experience to detract S’s attention away from that experience. For example, what if S 
has only ever seen her hands, without any experience of not-hand stuff, such as stumps? We may 
then reasonably say that S has epistemic access to E =R c-PQ, and consequently Ks that c-PQ, with 
P being hand-experiences and Q being stump-experiences, for she is clearly not experiencing 
stumps, and hands are not stumps. However, here is a case where we may also reasonably say that 
S does not believe, and thus does not KK, that c-PQ, because S has not yet made the inference 
from P to not-Q due to her lack of Q-experiences; for S, because she does not KK that she is not 
experiencing Q, S sees her hands without paying the required attention to the fact that she does not 
see stumps. Consequently, S would be able to KK that P, in the resolution that excludes Q, without 
KK-ing that c-PQ, for only P is ever consciously attended to, not P as not-Q, and not P as contrasted 
with Q. However, it is important to note that S still epistemically accesses E =R c-PQ, for any P-
experience is still evidence for the lack of Q-experiences, even if S is never aware of the evidence 
as such. Thus, we can model this type of infallible KK/K-ledge as (NCii**)-based contrastivist K-
 
34 In any case, specifying this way would aid in clarifying René van Woudenberg’s (2008) proposal that the contrastive 
proposition, c-PQ, is equivalent to the orthodox proposition, “if (P v Q), then P”. The latter works whether or not P 
logically excludes Q, given that Q could have just failed to obtain at the moment of P’s instantiation; however, for c-
PQ, P necessarily excludes Q. In other words, the set of P-Q relations in “if (P v Q), then P” is more extensive than 
that in c-PQ, meaning that, on one hand, once S consciously accesses E =R c-PQ, there is always the possibility that S 
can KK (Cii**) that c-PQ and KK (Cii*) that “if (P v Q), then P”; on the other hand, once S consciously accesses E 
=R “if (P v Q), then P”, there is not always the possibility that S can KK (Cii**) that c-PQ and KK (Cii*) that “if (P v 
Q), then P”. 
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ledge that c-PQ, with non-conscious access of E =R c-PQ, and as (Cii*)-based orthodox KK-ledge 
that P, with conscious access only of E =R P.
35 
To conclude, P differs from c-PQ in that KK-ledge of the former makes no conscious 
reference to the contrasts that are overt to one who KKs the latter. Nonetheless, the resolutions of 
both propositions are the same, although P is implicit in what its resolution excludes, namely Q, 
while c-PQ explicitly expresses its exclusion of Q. Lastly, c-PQ itself is not c-(P/not-P), which 
contrasts P with every possible not-P, for c-PQ does not lie at the maximum resolution, which 
contains a fully resolved P, while c-(P/not-P) does. With all this said, then, it is clear that the 
differences between P, c-PQ, and c-(P/not-P) serve to illustrate that we cannot hold every single 
possible contrast to P in our minds, connoting that some contrasts are irrelevant, some are implicit, 
and some are explicitly appropriated. Those explicit contrasts are proper to c-PQ, in that they are 
only what Q expresses when brought to bear in one’s mind. Irrelevant contrasts do not act to 
differentiate between P and Q – i.e., such contrasts are of a higher resolution than P or Q.36 Implicit 
contrasts are the domain of orthodox P, such that I can KK something in an orthodox fashion 
without being aware of the implicit contrast structure informing my contrastivist K-ledge of that 
 
35 Could S ever have (Cii**)-based contrastivist K-ledge that c-PQ along with (Cii*)-based orthodox KK-ledge that 
P? Yes. This would be the case wherein S has conscious access to E =R c-PQ without having that access be from what 
S forms her belief, i.e., S believes that P based on conscious access of E =R P while consciously accessing, but not 
believing, that E =R c-PQ. For example, S could be experiencing a stump along with a hand within the same conscious 
perceptual field without S ever paying specific attention to the stump experience for S’s formulation of her belief that 
she has hand experiences, which is different from her inexistent belief that she has hand experiences rather than stump 
experiences. This characterization of belief, wherein one could be conscious of something without being fully aware 
enough to instantiate a belief state is meant to express that epistemically accessing evidence allows for one to be fully 
aware of its truth in a way that one cannot help but be in a belief state regarding that evidence. Without entering 
substantively into a debate on the issue, we will simply note that this stance resembles those taken by Hieronymi 
(2009), Peels (2015), and Casey (2020), with a somewhat more antagonistic position being espoused by Setiya (2008). 
36 At the extreme end, we can reasonably reject KK-ledge of skeptical contrasts at epistemically inaccessible 
resolutions. This is a charge against Pritchard’s (2008) view that contrastivism safeguards our everyday knowledge 
against the skeptic by ‘groundlessly ignoring sceptical contrasts.’ (316) In terms of KK-ledge, Pritchard errs in his 
assessment, because we are grounded in ignoring the skeptical contrast, as we are unable to infallibly KK at such high 
resolutions. Nonetheless, in terms of K-ledge, rejection of said contrast is groundless, ala Pritchard, for just because 
we assuredly lack skeptical KK-ledge does not necessitate the lack of skeptical K-ledge. See Note 45 for further 
discussion. 
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something.37 This contrastivist K-ledge is, again, causally determined in that whatever contrast 
class is being epistemically accessed – non-consciously or consciously yet not doxastically – 
includes the features of reality that play a role in the causal history of one’s K-ledge.38 
Contrastive knowledge can then be distinguished from orthodox knowledge easily in terms 
of KK-ledge and consciously-accessed K-ledge – either (Cii*) or (Cii**)-based: what is 
consciously accessed by S can either be P with nothing else being acknowledged, or P as 
acknowledgedly excluding/contrasted against some Q. However, (NCii**)-based contrastive K-
ledge cannot be distinguished from (NCii*)-based orthodox K-ledge, since E =R P and E =R c-PQ, 
 
37 Implicit contrasts can also be the domain of contrastivist c-PQ if we acknowledge that there are contrasts to P of a 
lower resolution than Q, as implied from Section 4. (Let us refer to these other contrasts collectively as some X.) To 
explain, any member of X is automatically excluded from S’s infallible KK-ledge that c-PQ by the instantiation of c-
PQ, given that, if E =R c-PQ is already being accessed and doxastically reacted to, then any KK-ledge that c-XP would 
obtain only if one were to groundlessly reject KK-ledge that c-PQ by irrationally doubting c-PQ’s truth, which is 
absurd. However, this does not mean that S all of a sudden infallibly KKs that c-PX even if she does not KK that c-
XP, which is dissimilar to the c-PQ case, as S KKs that c-PQ even if she does not KK that c-QP. Thus, we can call X 
the collective term for the implicit contrasts to P. For example, KK-ing that one experiences hands rather than stumps 
is not to say that one automatically KKs that they experience hands rather than vague visual approximations to stumps. 
Furthermore, if we are instead dealing with contrasts to P of the same resolution to the Q in c-PQ, then the same 
conclusion holds; for example, KK-ing that one is having experiences of five fingers rather than no fingers is not to 
say that they necessarily KK that they are experiencing five fingers rather than having some (0 < n < 5)-experience of 
n fingers. 
38 This specification concerning the set of contrasts applicable to P when applied to contrastive and/or orthodox KK/K-
ledge entails that contrasts relevant for contrastive KK/K-ledge that c-PQ are set by the resolution of one’s infallible 
evidence for c-PQ and not by S’s pragmatic/contextual concerns. The appeal of this account is specific to contrastive 
KK/K-ledge as infallible KK/K-ledge of a target proposition that changes in concert with what contrasts become 
relevant to it. This consideration helps avoid many of the issues that have befallen the usual contextualist question-
oriented process of setting contrast saliency. These issues include, among others, the process’ lack of uniqueness to 
contrastivism (Neta, 2008) and its tendency to imprecisely set contrast propositions (Rourke, 2013). On the account 
of contrastive KK/K-ledge set out in this paper, the inherent capacity of c-PQ to already allocate its explicitly relevant 
contrasts is unique to contrastivism in that orthodox KK/K-ledge employs orthodox propositions that only factor in 
implicit contrasts. Furthermore, the precision with which c-PQ sets its contrast propositions is entirely dependent upon 
the resolution at hand, regardless of whatever non-propositionally driven event instantiates that can bring to light 
different possible contrasts for S. Therefore, at best, S’s non-propositional, i.e., pragmatic/contextual, concerns may 
just act to clarify how S has failed at attaining infallible KK-ledge that c-PQ. 
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albeit separately accessible in a conscious way, are both accessed together as the same E in a non-
conscious way: P and c-PQ both logically function to exclude the truth of Q, due to both 
propositions being at the same resolution, and infallible K-ledge that P, and c-PQ for that matter, 
manifests only when Q is excluded by one’s evidence (E). E =R P and E =R c-PQ are 
indistinguishable because they both logically function identically, but as their logical functions 
hinge upon their phenomenal natures being at the same resolution,39 then their phenomenal natures 
are identical as well, insofar as functional differences are tracked by phenomenal variations. 
Morever, since our account of infallible knowledge deals with phenomenal discrimination, then E 
=R P and E =R c-PQ are identical between (NCii**)-based and (NCii*)-based K-ledge.
40 The only 
reason, then, why KK-ledge can distinguish between E =R P and E =R c-PQ is because their 
otherwise identical phenomenal natures are consciously acknowledged differently regarding their 
logical entailments: S’s KK-ledge that c-PQ admits of its exclusionary logical function, while S’s 
KK-ledge that P is silent on the matter, and the exclusionary function is merely implied. The same 
applies to (Cii*)-based and (Cii**)-based K-ledge, for even without doxastic acknowledgement, 
E could still be consciously accessed by S differently as either P or c-PQ.41 
 
 
39 “Phenomenal” used broadly here to indicate both sensory phenomena and the phenomena of our thoughts. 
40 This is a reasonable assumption given that our use of phenomenal discrimination here ought to be sufficiently broad 
to encompass logical functional change, at least of the type of change that relevantly factors into differences we can 
discriminate in our consciously accessed evidence. This naturally expresses a distinction between our evidence’s 
logical and phenomenal character, which nonetheless relate in a fashion analogous to that between logically objective 
and psychologically objective reasons in argumentation. Cf., Novaes (2018, 514n3) for a discussion. 
41 See Note 35 for clarification, but just replace (Cii*)-based KK-ledge with (Cii*)-based K-ledge and take out any 
mention of belief. Notwithstanding, one may criticize that the discussion so far has left it open for (NCii*)-based and 
(NCii**)-based K-ledge to garner logical omniscience regarding the potentially infinitely varied contrasts to which a 
specifically resolved P can apply, given especially that a mind-independent E =R P or c-PQ logically contrasts with 
every contrast at P’s resolution or lower. My response would be that even if this was indeed the case, it is precisely 
why the account of KK-ledge given here is required so that knowledge in general does not have to admit of this type 
of contrastivist logical omniscience. One may further include the account of (Cii*)-based and (Cii**)-based K-ledge 
as functioning similarly to KK-ledge in terms of revoking this omniscience, as it is reasonable to assume that human 
consciousness cannot hold the potentially infinite applicable contrasts to some proposition at any one time. 
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9. Infallibilism and ad hoc Accounts from Contrastivist Eyes 
When S KKs that c-PQ, the lack of S’s rational doubt that c-PQ allows for the instantiation 
of c-PQ, when epistemically accessed and believed, to positively determine KK-ledge that c-PQ, 
since infallible KK-ledge and doubt mutually oppose each other. When given in terms of logical 
functionality of excluding Q’s truth, S’s lack of rational doubt becomes explainable as S’s 
conscious acknowledgement – i.e., belief – that c-PQ logically excludes the truth of Q in such a 
way that KK-ledge that c-PQ is seen as dealing solely with P in the resolution that excludes Q, as 
in, dealing non-ad hoc-ly with P through its logical exclusion of Q. Additionally, orthodox (Cii*)-
based KK-ledge can be considered non-ad hoc, but only inasmuch as it deals with E =R P, because 
the belief that is central to orthodox KK-ledge consists only in its acknowledgement of P’s truth 
as entailed by the epistemic access of E =R P, not the truth of P as contrasted against Q, given the 
lack of acknowledged access of E =R c-PQ. This means that orthodox KK-ledge is acknowledgedly 
non-ad hoc in its dealings with E =R P, but acknowledgedly ad hoc in its dealings with E =R c-
PQ.42 
Now, since infallible (NCii*)-based K-ledge that P functions identically to (NCii**)-based 
K-ledge that c-PQ, in terms of excluding Q’s truth, then these types of infallible contrastive and 
orthodox K-ledge are non-ad hoc when both deal either with E =R P or E =R c-PQ, but only insofar 
as the resolution of P that excludes Q is epistemically accessed;43 otherwise, this K-ledge would 
be fallible in its lack of access of E =R c-PQ, and any proposition that is not infallibly referenced 
to evidence cannot have its truth guaranteed by the evidence. As such, this lack of guarantee entails 
that fallible (NCii*)-based and (NCii**)-based K-ledge deals with some not-c-PQ consideration, 
 
42 Any knower, S, would be able to acknowledge the non-ad hoc-ness of her KK-ledge that P, if her experiential 
evidence is only of P. However, S would not be able to acknowledge the ad hoc-ness of her KK-ledge that c-PQ, 
because for S, there would not be any not-Q to acknowledge since she would not have had any Q-experiences. The 
acknowledgement of S’s contrastivist KK-ledge’s ad hoc-ness could only be feasible by another knower, besides S, 
who infallibly KKs that S has only acknowledged her access of E =R P, not E =R c-PQ. Consider this a contrastivist 
application of a contextualist regard for, as Williamson (2005) would say, ‘differences in the situation of the speaker 
who applies the word “know”’. (217) 
43 The same applies to (NCii*)-based and (NCii**)-based infallible KK-ledge due to the existence of non-conscious 
epistemic access. The same will also apply to (Cii*)-based and (Cii**)-based K-ledge below. 
Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra 
27 
 
thereby rescinding its non-ad hoc status.44 Consequently, for (NCii*)-based and (NCii**)-based 
K-ledge, they are non-ad hoc when the known proposition is either P or c-PQ, as non-conscious 
access of E =R P is already defined as simultaneous access of E =R c-PQ. For orthodox (Cii*)-
based K-ledge, it is non-ad hoc when the known proposition is expressed as P only, for just because 
S consciously accesses E =R P does not necessarily mean that she has had the required Q-
experiences to be conscious of the fact that E =R P can be consciously accessed as E =R c-PQ due 
to P logically entailing not-Q. For contrastivist (Cii**)-based K-ledge, it is non-ad hoc regardless 
of whether the known proposition is expressed in terms of P or c-PQ, since the conscious access 
of E =R c-PQ already entails having had evidential P-experiences, expressed as E =R P, but not 
necessarily vice versa. 
In summary, for epistemic infallibilism in general, we have these conclusions. Contrastivist 
(Cii**)-based KK/K-ledge that c-PQ is non-ad hoc for both P and c-PQ because what this KK/K-
ledge consciously captures that is necessarily about P is the resolution of P as well as its explicit 
contrast against Q, hence the explication of c-PQ as the infallibly known (KK/K) proposition that 
is also infallibly known (KK/K) as P. Orthodox (Cii*)-based KK/K-ledge that P is non-ad hoc 
only for P because what is necessarily consciously captured about P is the resolution of P that is 
implicitly contrasted against Q, hence the explication merely of P as the explicitly infallibly known 
(KK/K) proposition, not c-PQ. Lastly, contrastivist/orthodox (NCii**)-based and (NCii*)-based 
KK/K-ledge that c-PQ or P, respectively, is non-ad hoc for both c-PQ and P, since what is 
necessarily captured about P is its objective, logical function of infallibly excluding Q’s truth; the 
contrast of Q, here, becomes relevant whether implicated in P or explicated in c-PQ, as 
implication/explication is only significant when it comes to conscious epistemic access – i.e., non-
conscious access is able to transcend this implication/explication dichotomy.45  
 
44 This also means that, as long as K-ledge is made to deal only with the access of E =R c-PQ, then any K-ledge that 
deals with, say, an epistemically inaccessible E =R c-(P/not-P) would necessarily be ad hoc and fallible. 
45 If c-PQ is defined as the non-skeptical c-P1L, then nothing changes: non-conscious access of E =R P1 is possible 
and identical to non-conscious access of E =R c-P1L, with conscious access of E =R c-P1L being possible and entailing 
access of E =R P1, but not vice versa. If, instead, skeptical c-P2H is introduced, there are significant changes: non-
conscious access of E =R P2 is indeed still possible and identical to non-conscious access of E =R c-P2H. This is the 
common answer to the skeptic that secures knowledge of even skeptical propositions: the knowledge must be 
externalist, (NCii**)-based or (NCii*)-based K-ledge (See Note 24). Cf., Sinnott-Armstrong (2008, 267) and Pritchard 
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This conclusion also applies even if the maximum resolution of c-(P/not-P) is epistemically 
accessed – i.e. the resolution at which no higher skeptical resolution can be afforded – for just 
because one has access to the most absolute reality of P does not guarantee that one has ever had 
access to what could have been otherwise – i.e., some absolute not-P. In terms of KK-ledge, 
therefore, while contrastive KK-ledge that c-(P/not-P) is non-ad hoc regardless of whether the 
known proposition is expressed in terms of P or c-(P/not-P), orthodox KK-ledge that P is non-ad 
hoc only when the known proposition is expressed as P, not c-(P/not-P). This is because, while 
accessing E =R c-(P/not-P) already entails the access of E =R P, the latter by itself does not 
necessarily entail E =R c-(P/not-P) as epistemically accessed.
46 
10. Conclusion 
Throughout the discussion, we have been exploring ways in which we could begin arguing 
for indubitable and infallible knowledge. In terms of K-ledge, where justification functions non-
doxastically, we can model how P logically excludes some not-P, let us call it Q, by showing how 
such exclusion occurs within a context of phenomenal resolutions. Here, different P-resolutions 
logically exclude Q only at those and lower resolutions. In this case, contrastivism acts as a 
conceptual tool facilitating the specification of to what extent and at which resolution P excludes 
varying Qs, such that any legitimate claim of infallibly K-ing that “P rather than Q” is a non-ad 
hoc-claim of K-ledge at the specified resolution of c-PQ. This important act of resolution 
specification attenuates the risk of ad hoc-ly claiming infallibly K-ledge that P at resolutions higher 
than what one’s evidentiary capacities infallibly reference. A similar conclusion applies to 
infallible KK-ledge, the only difference being that, for KK-ledge claims, they are justified in how 
they propositionally refer to evinced phenomenal resolutions by virtue of S’s conscious awareness 
of the self-referentiality between the proposition and resolution at hand – my KK-ledge that c-PQ 
 
(2008, 309-314) for similarly related discussions. However, conscious access of either E =R c-P2H and/or E =R P2 is 
impossible, as P2 and P1, along with their relevant contrasts, are consciously indistinguishable: P2 can only be 
consciously acknowledgeable within the resolution of P1, given that P2 → P1, and that P2’s skeptical resolution is 
necessarily a non-conscious one. As such, we can have non-conscious skeptical K-ledge without having conscious 
skeptical KK/K-ledge, which is crucial, according to Pritchard (2008), to avoid the risk of confusing ‘the conditions 
under which it is appropriate to claim knowledge with the conditions under which one knows.’ (319) 
46 This may be one way to oppose the view that contrastivist and orthodox knowledge are reconciled in the maximal 
case of P = c-(P/not-P). Cf., Gijsbers (2018, §6) for an adumbration of this view in terms of general explanation.  
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is also my awareness that c-PQ only at the moment of its non-ampliative referral to the evidence 
subsisting within the proper resolution of c-PQ required for P to logically exclude Q. For K-ledge 
claims on the other hand, justification can be garnered via either non-conscious epistemic access 
as some externalist causal modality, or conscious epistemic access as some internalist causal 
modality, the latter denoting the case wherein what becomes phenomenally evinced factors into 
my consciousness without me being fully conscious of it. 
Lastly, the detailing of resolutions at which some P is validly contrasted against some Q 
can also work to clarify how the two structures of P and c-PQ relate to contrastivist and orthodox 
KK/K-ledge. For instance, c-PQ is proper to infallible accounts of contrastive KK/K-ledge that c-
PQ. The main difference then between KK-ledge and K-ledge, besides the presence of belief, is 
whether implicit or explicit propositional references made to the contrasts of some P inform KK-
ledge or K-ledge. For example, in the case of the low resolution of, say, the canary-raven contrast 
class, one can infallibly KK that there is a canary at the resolution required to exclude the 
possibility of a raven being at that resolution. This occurs without necessarily KK-ing the fact that 
this canary-resolution mutually excludes the possibility of any other thing besides this contrasted 
raven-phenomenon at resolutions similar to or lower than the accessed canary-resolution. This is 
in effect the distinction between infallibly KK-ing and K-ing that there is a canary rather than a 
raven: I can KK/K the canary-raven contrast class while also K, but not KK, the relevant canary-
(every-other-thing) contrast class, because what I am doxastically reacting to is the explicit 
contrast of canary and raven at a resolution that does validly exclude both from being true at the 
time that (E =R “canary rather than raven”) is being consciously accessed. I am not therefore being 
made aware of the contrasts involved in the canary-(every-other-thing) class that are only implied 
in my conscious access of E =R “canary rather than raven” for my (Cii**)-based KK/K-ledge that 
there is a canary rather than a raven. These contrasts are instead accounted for by my non-
conscious epistemic access instantiating my (NCii**)-based K-ledge that there is a canary rather 
than a raven.  
We can finally extend this distinction between explicit and implicit contrasts to inform the 
distinction between infallible orthodox KK/K-ledge and contrastivist KK/K-ledge: the explicit 
contrasts involved in the contrastive proposition, “canary rather than raven”, are those given by 
“raven”, while for the orthodox proposition, “canary”, all contrasts are implicit, none are explicit. 
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